Conversation
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko
Edited 19 hours ago
I would not call landstrip and opencode-landstrip as stable software just yet, but at least I've started to forget that the sandbox is active, unless it asks for a new permission.
I hit a bug in every two or three days, and the code base becoming less of a chaos i.e., all the convergence metrics are pointing to the right direction :-) Windows was quite rotten up until recent releases when I got some great feedback from an actual dog food eating Windows user.
While the most of the sandbox implementations taken the obvious container approach, I modeled a coding agent as follows:
1. A coding agent are bit like web browsers.
2. Thus, the process model for a sandbox should be modeled from a browser tab.
Based on these premises I made a Linux-container-free implementation, which protects the sensitive data with a combination of Landlock and SECOMP filters in Linux, Seatbelt (SBLT) in macOS and Win32 AppContainer framework in Windows, and adheres to Anthropic Sandbox Runtime JSON policy.
The chose approach has also many robustness benefits. E.g., nested containers are not required for CI runs.
My 3rd inference engine will land to Landstrip in foreseeable future. It will be be part of the sentinel layer for I/O, which protects the secrets even when prompt injection attacks are in effect.
#landstrip #opencode #agent #sandbox #anthropic #infosec
I hit a bug in every two or three days, and the code base becoming less of a chaos i.e., all the convergence metrics are pointing to the right direction :-) Windows was quite rotten up until recent releases when I got some great feedback from an actual dog food eating Windows user.
While the most of the sandbox implementations taken the obvious container approach, I modeled a coding agent as follows:
1. A coding agent are bit like web browsers.
2. Thus, the process model for a sandbox should be modeled from a browser tab.
Based on these premises I made a Linux-container-free implementation, which protects the sensitive data with a combination of Landlock and SECOMP filters in Linux, Seatbelt (SBLT) in macOS and Win32 AppContainer framework in Windows, and adheres to Anthropic Sandbox Runtime JSON policy.
The chose approach has also many robustness benefits. E.g., nested containers are not required for CI runs.
My 3rd inference engine will land to Landstrip in foreseeable future. It will be be part of the sentinel layer for I/O, which protects the secrets even when prompt injection attacks are in effect.
#landstrip #opencode #agent #sandbox #anthropic #infosec
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