Conversation
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko
imho at least qemu would need snp and tdx emulation in upstream for like testing patches. i mean most have x86 so even rigged emulation would do the job for trivial patch testing
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heck maybe it would be even possible to fixup "knowingly known cryptographic material" that would be fixed up also to the qemu code base to which Intel's and AMD's servers would respond as legitimately.or maybe salt somehow to stamp the fake stamp. like just for infrasturcuture QA type of stuff use.
this is not an issue in the CA part as e.g. AMD already today has a rate-limited attestation paradigm. so yeah i think really would make sense for companies to spend money for fixing up this.
this is not an issue in the CA part as e.g. AMD already today has a rate-limited attestation paradigm. so yeah i think really would make sense for companies to spend money for fixing up this.
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because of the hard-bound bare metal depeendency quality assurance in the real sense of that word like super-transparent does not exist in this world for confidential computing no wonder it is confidential when it is not even measured by most of the qa infrastructure existing. totally fights against the marketing promise.
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In SGX attestation, which mostly applies also to TDX, you could possibly use e.g. enclave attribute for this defined by the ISA spec (Intel SDM). I mean for the "fake stamp". Attestation can refuse to attest if the provision matches to some list inside archiectural enclave (aka Intell signed) but that "fake stamp" attribute is not set.
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