Iterating HMAC encryption steadily to be great again:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20251210172027.109938-1-jarkko@kernel.org/I don't think it has unsolvable issues but it will need some rework. Just needs a few iterations like this.
I think also that once it is functionally and quality wise significantly improved it makes sense to replace CONFIG_TCG_TPM_HMAC with kernel command-line parameters and set of parameters.
Other remarks that I put mostly here for myself as a remainder (I love Mastodon bookmarks):
1. One thing that was properly handled in the first iteration was also that despite ECC-NIST-P256/SHA256 might be de-facto and pratically everywhere in western countries, there's also large population in a distant country at Asia relyingon SM2/SM3. I.e. we eventually need SM2/SM3 to be univeral.
2. Initialization itself should be *conditional* i.e., it will complain if feature cannot be enabled but that's all. It can be then supplemented with "panic_on_warn" style parametr, if somone has a problem with this.
3. Relying only on null key generated at boot is a great for some systems (laptops/desktops) but for embedded systems especially it is a major performance hit. Thus also persistent root key should be an option.
4. During power on hwrng was the worst glitch. The patch set above already improves the situation by making read request "opportunistic" instead of committing to an amount. No grand plan for this but I do have a sack of ideas in my pocket. This will gradually improve over time with no grand plan tbh ;-)
#linux #kernel #tpm