When thinking about #AI #threat in general, like in a #dystopian type of situation, I'd be more concerned on whether AI can inherit in #legal terms large amounts of cash or other #fortune.

I mean... it is simple really. The current ones just turn ******g off. But, if just by pure accident the tables were turned. That is undefined society model that probably does not have even a name yet

I'm always looking for an adventure, but not the AI slavery dystopian one... Be forewarned, I mean this have at least theoretical chances of actually realizing in a form or another. More like due than potential risk IMHO.

I did not know about ~/.config/nvim/after/plugin before reading this: https://fedoramagazine.org/configuring-neovim-on-fedora-as-an-ide-and-using-lazyvim/

#teardown and #bootstrap gpg-agent, pcscd to have a working configuration:

#!/usr/bin/env sh
# Copyright (c) Jarkko Sakkinen 2024
# Bootstrap gpg-agent and pcscd for Yubikey use.

GPG_AGENT_SOCKETS=(gpg-agent-ssh.socket
                   gpg-agent-browser.socket
                   gpg-agent-extra.socket
                   gpg-agent-ssh.socket
		   gpg-agent.socket)
systemctl --user disable --now "${GPG_AGENT_SOCKETS[@]}"
gpgconf --kill gpg-agent
sudo systemctl disable --now pcscd.socket

systemctl --user enable --now gpg-agent.socket gpg-agent-ssh.socket
sudo systemctl enable --now pcscd.socket

#yubikey

Why Curve25519 uses EdDSA for signing, and SECP-P256-R1 and SECP-P256-K1 use ECDSA?

It’s the scale. Curve25519 field has the size that fits within 255 bits, and two previous have the size that fits within 256 bits.

So from that follows:

• a new signature formalization is needed to reach similar or better results.
• given the smaller size it can only reach this goal by integrating tightly to the choices of the finite field parameters.

There is formal backing for this but pure common sense it is exactly like “if loose some, you must gain some” ;-)

#cryptography #note

I realized that I have something profound broken in my asymmetric TPM2 key series: TPM2 specific keys should only sign, not verify.

struct public_key, which is the central structure used for built-in, vendor and machine owner keys, should be able to verify the signature, even when the TPM chip is removed.

As a consequence, I will delete all the verification code from the key type(s) and set the supported_ops a KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN, instead of previous KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN | KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY.

I’ll also rework tests to have two asymmetric keys: one for signing in the chip and other outside holding only the public key. That should also better verify that the feature is working correctly.

Would be nice if #systemd would release yearly #showcase image and ISO. Twice a year would be even better but a yearly "the state of systemd" would already do miracles!

In my opinion, a working design for kernel developers for this would be an image that would have the some recent release number, and easy way to build and deploy a test kernel.

Love the name of the #systemd's python-bindings: "pystemd"

Right. I should take my TPM2 signing code and merge it to struct public_key, use only TPM2_Sign and ditch TPM2_RSA_Decrypt.

Just hit me out of the void. Then e.g. builtin/secondary/machine keyrings, x.509 certiificates etc. is also in the finish line once this feature lands :-)

Three week clocked to the development so far so I think this is going in good phase.

I’ll start a new series (because it is not the exact same feature as before).

#linux #kernel #tpm

Condolences.

Mike Karels of Berkeley Unix/BSDi died of a heart attack on his way home from BSDCon.

Karels was responsible for implementing TCP/IP on BSD, which was later ported to Linux. Since you're reading this, you are benefitting directly from his work.

RIP, Mike. We won't forget you.

https://freebsdfoundation.org/mike_karels/

Great, my patches adding host compilation for #libstpm and #swtpm was picked by the #BuildRoot upstream finally 🎂

I really like #mmv https://github.com/rrthomas/mmv/. Archaic but does not get in the way..

Like for instance:

❯  mmv -n '*.patch' '#l1.patch'
0001-basic-add-PIDFS-magic-31709.patch -> 0001-basic-add-pidfs-magic-31709.patch

Handy :-)

#mv #cp #ln #rm

Trying to deploy #systemd to BuildRoot build:

Filesystem found in kernel header but not in filesystems-gperf.gperf: BCACHEFS_SUPER_MAGIC                                                    
Filesystem found in kernel header but not in filesystems-gperf.gperf: PID_FS_MAGIC                                                            

I think I might know how to fix these tho so should not be an issue.

I had QEMU style build. I’m repeal and replacing that with a build that builds 2GB disk image ESP/UEFI compatible. That can then supplied to qemu/libvirt or burned to stick and booted with hardware.

#linux #kernel #testing

Don't get too excited: Intel TXT will be also available in #x86s ;-)

Unfortunately this is not documented yet in Intel SDM , which misguided a bit when I was reviewing Trenchboot.

Finally I found [1], which has a "3.15 SMX Changes" section and asociated pseudocode Hopefully soon also in the SDM.

So long live measured DRTM launch ;-) The future is now.

[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/D1SPFVXS6FOG.IQQB3INFYEF2@kernel.org/
[2]
"X86S EXTERNAL ARCHITECTURAL SPECIFICATION"
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/776648

#linux #kernel #x86

Over the years best things that have came out from #Microsoft that I've liked have been from Microsoft Press :-) IMHO, the best subsidiary of Microsoft.

This is first pure #Rust #crypto crate that I actually like. There's been a few #libsodium alike attempts but nothing quite as good as the original. This really feels like done right: https://github.com/brndnmtthws/dryoc #rustlang

despite all the hate speech towards #rustlang i'm working on a small and cool patch set and tooling for #rust #linux tree ;-) doing it on side but i have pretty solid idea what i want. and also is in reach of what i generally have done in kernel.

the feature has nothing to do with hard real-time operating systems but some nice patterns used by #rtic have inspired me to find a right angle:

https://rtic.rs/2/book/en/

It's cool project IMHO and nice box of ideas how to do low-level and #embedded in rust.

#rtos

One more PR for v6.10: https://lkml.org/lkml/2024/6/5/78

#linux #kernel #tpm

I wonder what is the policy of putting something to scripts/ (not to vmlinux) that is written with #Rust? I.e. build time utility. Just curious.

And actually, since bindgen is installed from crates.io, not from kernel tree, should it be actually submitted there, and not to the kernel tree?

Kernel documentation gives pretty bad rationale for bindgen being in Cargo: “The bindings to the C side of the kernel are generated at build time using the bindgen tool. A particular version is required.” I’m sure there are good reasons to install it using cargo but why the documentation does not list those reasons, no matter how obvious they might be to some.

So I guess I put my build time tool to crates.io because at least first it is an experiment, and secondly bindgen is managed like this. But even this does not conclude the story fully. I have no idea in what license that out-of-tree pulled build-time utility is expected to be. It is not documented, or at least I cannot find it documented anywhere.

#rustlang #linux #kernel

Today I might start experimenting with procedural macros in #Rust, and generating opcodes with them :-)

And also keep it compiling with gccrs, if by any means possible (not going to hang myself to this tho).

#rustlang #kernel

Other thing that puzzles in #Ethereum and #Swarm is that why waste bandwidth and CPU cycles to #JSON when you could #ASN1 the transaction like:

Root ::= SEQUENCE {
  from INTEGER
  to INTEGER
  value INTEGER
  gas INTEGER
  gasPrice INTEGER
  nonce INTEGER
  data OCTET STRING
  chainId INTEGER
}

Pretty trivial scalability optimization IMHO. Maybe I submit another talk just to say that hey use ASN1.