I'm so happy that I've made on full usable computer program with Rust now, including backend code (tpm2-protocol).

It does not really matter if it is good or bad but a psychological barrier has definitely been broken. Program #2 will be so much easier and fun than this ;-)

I sometimes wonder Linux Foundation is not involved with Himmelblau IDM, given how important project it is for the Linux ecosystem overall.

https://mytechinsights.wordpress.com/2025/08/06/himmelblau-1-0-released-finally-real-intune-policy-enforcement-on-linux/

#himmelblau #azure #intune @linuxfoundation

Servo 0.0.1

https://servo.org/blog/2025/10/20/servo-0.0.1-release/

Great news for web.

#servo #web

#nom is like the first library in Rust of which I can say that I love it, and not because it is "powered by Rust" but because it is such a great peace of work overall :-) #rustlang

Now that I can actually clean up tpm2sh as I reached "zero known relevant bugs" state couple of days ago, some cool features will spun from that.

E.g., most of the time you don't have to specify parent key, the tool will discover it for you.

I'll also implement virtual persistent handles by retaining in cache TPMKey ASN.1 file in addition to context and that enables to implement fake evict operation to 0x81-range.

And already now management of TPM2 sessions is mostly transparent like it should be, and implicitly created HMAC sessions will gain parameter encryption soon.

In pre-existing TPM2 stacks (e.g., tpm2-tool) having sessions exposed out naked to the user is like having a TLS stack where you would need manually implement session key exchange dance. It's just plain fucking wrong imho :-)

#tpm2sh

breaking: white house being replaced by a white trailer park

For VM/embedded images socat is pretty alternative to curl as it has 50% less dependencies and you can still web e.g.,

printf 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.iki.fi\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' | socat OPENSSL:www.iki.fi:443 -

I’ve replaced curl with socat in my BuildRoot images for kernel testing because it is less bloated than curl ;-)

Cargo would be better if it had a separate unique and label names for dependencies, and dependency resolution used the former.

Basing immutablity to a label makes crates.io quite unrobust IMHO, and given that not all projects fly that far, otherwise useful labels stay reserved permanently, up until Sun melts.

Such dual-name scheme could be transparent to Cargo.toml: e.g. Cargo.lock could map a label to a name.

I'm not saying that names would need to have expiration time. I'm thinking more like willingly giving name back to circulation from abandoned project.

C++ has bunch of offerings now for cargo alike package managers. In that front, I'd try to find a solution that is smarter than Cargo before there is a dominating solution.

#rustlang #cargo

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/tpm2sh.git/tree/src/wildcard.rs?h=main

made a little wildcard parser last night so that I don’t have to implement docker esque “tpm2sh reset” command.

e.g. cache can be reseted now by tpm2sh delete 'vtpm:*'

386.

After starting this work one Sunday on August and ~13000 lines of new Rust code after that, this is the first release where I don't have any catastrophical bugs to resolve, or have personally any immediate needs :-)

https://crates.io/crates/tpm2sh

#linux #rustlang #tpm

tpm2sh policy has now more inituitive infix expressions :-) [learning nom by trial and error]

I’m planning to iteratively make tpm2sh policy subcommand to compile policy expressions first into eBPF i.e., --mode ebpf option.

We can use this to address bottleneck in trusted keys in kernel: TPMKey ASN.1 provides key blob but not steps how to create policy session that authorizes the key.

Today: TpmKey ASN.1 with auth value and policy digest can be passed but really only auth value (+ PCR selection in TPM2_Create) can be used for authentication.

My vision for policy protected keys is basically:

1. Key data is passed as TPMKey ASN.1 just like today.
2. In addition eBPF program for creation policy session is passed when policy digest is used.

It’s perfectly secure given that a malicious eBPF program would end up to a different policy digest than what is associated with the key.

#linux #kernel #tpm

Refined the interface of offloaded objects:

1. Objects resident/loaded in TPM: tpm:
2. Offloaded objects: vtpm:

Thus, I removed also "key" and "session" subcommands and introduced "virtual" subcommand.

#linux #tpm #rustlang

tpm2sh 0.11.16

This is the release where things mostly work and is first usable version for wider audience than just me.

Functionality is focused on key management and it is quite limited on operations.

That said, it the most important functionalities, and most difficult to implement, in place:

1. Implicit creation of HMAC sessions to protect communication, and hiding its complexity . It is still a stub as parameter encryption is not in place but the mechanism is working correctly.
2. Key management including direct support for PKCS#1, PKCS#8 and SEC1 external keys with custom parsers so that dependencies are light for e.g., BuildRoot embedded/VM targets. 3, Seamless over-subscription with key context cache (in ~/.cache/tpm2sh). Detects stale contexts from previous power cycles. “Cache keys” can be referred bit “key:<hex grip>” type of “URI”, where grip is 8 bytes of the key’s name hash.
3. Seamless policy sessions with policy command, which can output both composite digest and session handle.
4. Intuitive way to download vendor certificates from the chip.
5. Full support for the TPMKey ASN.1 format, which is what kernel speaks.

Adding signing etc. ops would have been worse mistake to do before getting this basis right.

It’s not aiming to do all what tpm2-tools does but more like do stuff that I want to do and implementing that as a command-line tool :-) I.

#linux #kernel #tpm #rustlang #buildroot

tpm2sh 0.11: https://crates.io/crates/tpm2sh/0.11.0

cli philosophy, which I should document to README.md, is that no nested subcommands thank you. That constraint enforces to do efficient subcommand design (IMHO).

#linux #kernel #tpm

Reasons why I wrote my own parsers for PKCS#1, SEC1 and PKCS#8 on top of awesome rasn [1] crate instead of using e.g., pkcs8 crate is that:

1. Usually generic crates do so much useless shit outside of the app's requirements so it might not be huge effort to make focused code tuned for the app.
2. Compilation times.
3. It gave me so much DOWNGRADE options, thanks to simpler depenencies, which is huge robustness addition. It's something you learn to appreciate once you do anything embedded/FPGA on ANY language.

[1] https://github.com/librasn/rasn

#linux #rustlang #tpm

I did not know I was this far with loading PKCS#8 keys as I was fully focus for few weeks on TPM2_Import:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/tpm2sh.git/commit/?h=main&id=9b4e31f8bea02953d56d8243a1b9157096642c54

I.e. I had enough parsing code to tell the user that PKCS#8 is not supported that I could now just as well just plain load them ;-)

#linux #tpm

I'm now in zero known bugs state with tpm2sh so maybe it is good soon to release 0.11, which is first real release TBH. Previous were test code for tpm2-protocol

External key loading and import was like something I debugged ridiculous amount of times but considering how many openssl commands you need to do to achieve same result, I'm pretty happy :-)

I also stick to SEC1 and PKCS#1 simply because this is not openssl, and you can use other tools to convert keys to these formats. This allows me NOT to use crazy complex loader crates like pkcs8 crate and have my fully custom loaders made using rasn crate.

#linux #tpm

in tpm2-tools one thing that destroys CLI ergonomics as temporary files that you trash your filesystem with.

I have:

❯ cargo run context list
Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.07s
Running `target/debug/tpm2sh context list`
context://4a77dd6d38efc808 primary ecc-nist-p256(sha256)
context://83b9e6c06223acd6 secondary ecc-nist-p256(sha256)
context://e227342ffe74a76c secondary rsa-2048(sha256)

❯ cargo run session list
Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.07s
Running `target/debug/tpm2sh session list`
tpm://0x02000000 hmac
tpm://0x03000001 policy

At start tpm2sh does refresh for both lists:

1. context load+save+flush for keys
2. context load+save for sessions

And detects stale loads and deletes those entries i.e, those from previous power cycle.

When one refers to contexts or sessions these URIs must be used as references. All the data is stored at ~/.cache/tpm2sh/.

Inorder to bring cross-compatibility with tpm2-tools load-command supports loading context files and migrating them to tpm2sh caches.

#linux #tpm