I should publish this humble and not so exciting crate (stalled since Dec) and now I found the motivating factor. I make it compile with gccrs.
Maybe this will leads to contributions, who knows, or epic failure but should be interesting and exciting in all cases :-)
The stimulus obviously comes from GCC 14 release, which has the first experimental version of gccrs. And in my free time I do prefer GPL licensed code base for utilities and apps over MIT/Apache, so gccrs makes more sense for me than rustc in that sense (and not judging other viewpoints, it is my personal and subjective preference).
@lindi2 @pid_eins good news, Linus pulled my PR’s in queue:https://social.kernel.org/notice/AhrCE3Z7RqcBa1p1Hc. So the changes are now in the mainline.
For security research: HMAC pipe is for the kernel clients we do not want to layer /dev/tpm0. It can be done just as well in the user space (and should be when required).
I.e. right now for trusted keys, and soon’ish for asymmetric keys (feature requried for x.509 certificates [1]). You can also grep the call sites by:
$ git grep "tpm2_start_auth_session(.*);"
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c: rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c: err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
include/linux/tpm.h:int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c: rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c: rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c: rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
x.509 part will be 6.11 feature.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-woodhouse-cert-best-practice/ NOTE: a bit out of date, I chatted quickly with David and he is planning to remove TPM 1.2 and DSA keys from the draft.
My first trial to split pull request to TPM, trusted keys, keyring parts: all three pull requests taken by pr-tracker-bot :—–O
One more left for asymmetric keys. Cannot believe this, I always screw up with this dance at least first time :-) Really made my Monday!
The City of #Helsinki Education Division #databreach has upto 120000 victims: "the perpetrator has gained access to the usernames and email addresses of all city personnel, as well as the personal IDs and addresses of students, guardians and personnel from the Education Division."
The attacker also gained access to confidential or sensitive records stored on a network share. The beach occurred due to unpatched known vulnerability getting exploited to gain unauthorized access. https://www.hel.fi/en/news/investigation-into-helsinki-education-division-data-breach-proceeds https://www.hel.fi/en/decision-making/data-breach #infosec #cybersecurity